For more on John Manley's report on Afghanistan, visit our roundup on Inside the Queensway

John Manley's much-anticipated report on the future of Canada's mission in Afghanistan has now been tabled and its contents are as predictable as they are ultimately disappointing. What has caused the erosion of public support for the mission is the perception that, somewhere along the line, we lost our direction and ended up engaged in combat operations instead of rebuilding a shattered country. The Manley panel's suggestion that we simply "stay the course" is not going to win back dissenters when it is the course itself they are questioning.

The proposed caveat that we should discontinue our military commitment if NATO fails to find us yet another partner in Kandahar willing to deploy another 1,000 combat troops is absurd. There are more than enough NATO soldiers and firepower in southern Afghanistan right now to keep the Taliban restricted to their hit-and-run roadside bombings. It would seem that this proviso was intended to once again point the finger of blame at our allies and to thump our chest in a reminder to all that Canada is doing the "heavy lifting."

The Choppers are another stale old chestnut. We have been hearing the Army commanders calling for Chinooks since we first moved south to Kandahar in 2006. In fact, the money has already been announced by the Harper government to acquire a fleet of these helicopters as soon as possible. Unfortunately the producers are faced with a backlog of orders for these transports, and it is unlikely any of them will get into Canadian service prior to 2011. Perhaps the Manley panel feels the threat of discontinuing our committment if we fail to get these aircraft will propel us to the front of Boeing's Chinook assembly line?

The big recomendation from Manley was of course the shift from focusing on combat to training the Afghan National Army (ANA). Once again, this is something the Canadian military has been promoting for the past several months. Unfortunately, this new report makes no real concrete suggestions towards the establishment of professional Afghan military cadres like the medical, logistic, police, legal and engineering officers that will be required to make the ANA a stand-alone force one day. Instead this report implies a "stay the course" extension of our instructors' churning out of Afghan infantry units. If we don't begin to create an educated, literate, professional Afghan army, NATO will never be able to disengage. Yes, this will take time and cost money, but the current process of cheaply training and equipping Afghan cannon fodder is not in anyone's long-term interest.

In short, the Manley report was a missed opportunity for Canada to change direction while continuing our commitment to the people of Afghanistan.

Scott Taylor, a former professional soldier, has been editor and publisher of Esprit de Corps, an Ottawa-based magazine celebrated for its unflinching scrutiny of the Canadian military, since 1988.

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